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I. INTRODUCTION

As described in the publication Capturing the Voice of the
American Law Institute, the goal of a restatement of law is not just to
restate the majority rules of law throughout the United States, but
also to "ascertain the relative desirability of competing rules."'
According to the ALI's guide for drafters, "[a] Restatement thus
assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to and
respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is
* Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thanks to Professor Ken DauSchmidt and Indiana University Maurer School of Law for organizing this Symposium, and
thanks to the editors of the Employee Rights and Employment Policy Law Journal. Thanks also
to Professor Matthew Finkin for his comments on this Article and work in this area. See, e.g.,
MATTEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (4th ed. 2013); MATrHEW

W. FINKIN,

Dischargeand Disgrace,1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (1997)
1. AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A
HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 5 (2d. ed. 2015)
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inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a whole."2
This broad view of the function of restatements raises the
question of what the purpose of the "law as a whole" is when it comes
to workplace defamation and wrongful interference claims in the
Restatement of Employment Law (REL). As stated in comment (a) to
REL section 6.01:
Defamation law provides a remedy to employees who suffer
reputational harm, often causing the loss of employment or
employment opportunities, because their employers or former
employers published unprivileged false and defamatory statements
about them, intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. The public,
however, has a strong countervailing interest in open and candid
communications between employers, by employers with licensing
or regulatory authorities, and among employees of the same
employer, concerning the skills, performance, capabilities, and
character of employees and former employees."'
This, the Reporters assert, is the reason for the qualified
privilege of 6.02, "in addition to other privileges."Those "other
privileges," though, remain a mystery. The qualified privilege applies
only to communications between employers about employees.'
In this article, I argue that the REL misses the opportunity to
address power relations between employers and employees as part of
the "law as a whole" in the torts of the workplace. I argue that the
omission shows the limits of restatements generally. As I will discuss
below, however, there were other roads not taken by the drafters that
might have acknowledged these power differentials in the final draft.
I also argue that the normative choices that are made by the REL
about the doctrine of compelled self-publication are based on
questionable footings. "[A]cceptance of the doctrine [of compelled
self-publication] would have a chilling effect on the free flow of
information."' There should be no compelled self-publication if the
employer tells the employee of its intent to repeat the defamatory
statement to future regulatory bodies or employers. This highly
unlikely scenario means that the doctrine is all but dead. But why?
What incentives would employers have to give employees notice that
they planned to defame employees to prospective employees?

2. Id.
3. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 6.01 cmt. d (quoting Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 837 A.2d 759, 765 (Conn.
2004)). 1 believe there is a difference between the free flow of information for workers and
employers. The REL does not address this asymmetry.

2017]

DEFAMATION AND WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE

565

Chapter Six of the REL deals with defamation, wrongful
interference and misrepresentation. This article deals with the first
two torts; misrepresentation is addressed by Professor Helen Norton
in another essay in this volume. Our division of labor makes sense,
because the torts of wrongful interference and defamation share
several commonalities. This article will proceed first with the tort of
defamation. Then, I will discuss the lesser known tort of wrongful
interference, which is addressed in REL sections 6.03 and 6.04.
In the final section, I will offer my own vision of "the law as a
whole" as it pertains to the torts of defamation and wrongful
interference in employment law. In my view, "the law as a whole"
puts the power of the at-will arrangement at the center and suggests
some policy choices that the drafters could have made differently to
better reflect the trends in the law and how legislative chambers
might be guided in their individual states.
There are several reasons that American law protects reputation
that are unique to the workplace. In an employment-at-will
environment, defamation provides a minimal check on the power of
the employer to injure the employees. Also, there is a dignitary
interest in preventing the dissemination of false information. There
are also economic interests to be protected which are also protected
by economic torts.
In the workplace, the tort of defamation and the attendant
privileges serve different purposes. Defamation liability can serve the
important purpose in a tight labor market to ensure that workers are
not unfairly prevented from obtaining other opportunities. While the
need for the REL has been debated, now that the final REL has been
published, it remains to be seen what its impact will be on all areas of
employment law.6 The impact of the REL may be relatively slight on
defamation and wrongful interference torts for the various structural
reasons that I will discuss below.

6. See Labor Law Group - U.C. Hastings Symposium on the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2009); Symposium, Papers from the
American Bar Foundation- The Labor Law Group Conference on the ProposedRestatement of
Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 359 (2012); Symposium: Assessing the
Restatement of Employment Law, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 1245 (2015); see e.g., Matthew Finkin,
Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 279, 298
(2005); Michael Zimmer, The Restatement of Employment Law is the Wrong Project, 13 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 205 (2009).
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II. SECTIONS 6.01-6.02: THE TORT OF DEFAMATION

Black letter defamation law is set forth in section 6.01 of the
REL:
(a) Subject to the privilege stated in 6.02 and other applicable
privileges, an employer publishing a false and defamatory
statement about an employee is subject to liability for the harm the
publication causes.
(b) An employer who publishes a statement about an employee
when the employer makes the statement:
(1) to any third party, including prospective employers, regulatory
authorities, or employment agencies
(2) to employees or others within the employer's organization
(3) to the employee, if the employer knows or should know that the
employee will have to disclose the statement to prospective
employers or others, the employee asks the employer to promise
not to disclose the statement to any third party, and the employer
refuses to promise.

REL's approach to defamation is understandably tied to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
The limits of a REL generally will not be readdressed here. Professor
Matthew Finkin, in particular, gave a detailed critique of the
defamation and wrongful interference torts and also workplace
privacy in the earlier drafts of the Restatement.7 Certain structural
factors should have been considered that make defamation claims
between employers and employees more difficult. There is also a
paucity of litigation over these issues recently because of the
increased reticence of employers to provide any references at all
besides dates of service and last position held.' These are the areas
where the Restatement does not adequately capture the reality of the
workplace today.

7. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, An Excursion Through Strange Terrain: Chapters 6
(Defamation) and 7 (Privacy and Autonomy), 16 EMP. Rrs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 465 (2012); Reuel
Schiller, "It is Not Wisdom but Authority Makes a Law:" A Historical Perspective on the
Problem of Creating A Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 39
(2009); Lea VanderVelde, The Proposed Restatement of Employment Law at Midpoint, 16 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 359 (2012).
8. Alex Long, The Forgotten Role of Consent in Defamation and Employment Reference
Cases, 66 FLA. L. REv. 719, 721 (2014) (citing Matthew W. Finkin & Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
Solving the Employee Reference Problem: Lessons from the German Experience, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 387, 390 (2009), reporting results of a 2004 Society of Human Resource Management
which found that only 53 percent of the respondents gave a reason for termination when asked
about an employee)).

DEFAMATION AND WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE
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A. How Common Are Workplace Defamation Claims?
There are several reasons why these cases may not be very
common. Most employees who are having difficulty finding a job are
unlikely to bring a lawsuit even if they are defamed. Their first goal is
finding a job. Thus, the sample size of available opinions might be
smaller than in other areas of law, and may have decreased because
of the increasing number of employers who no longer candidly give
references. Indeed, this is one area where tort liability to third parties
for negligent references becomes an issue.9 For that reason, the
absence of ways in which third persons might be liable or responsible
for the employer's actions is also notable.
An employer who is alleged to defame an employee has wide
latitude to make statements of opinion consistent with the qualified
privilege that the Restatement clearly sets out in section 6.02. This
employer is only liable under this qualified privilege if the employer
publishes the statement either 1) knowing it is false or with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity; or 2) knowing or having reason to
know that the employer or recipient has no legitimate interest in the
receiving the statement.10
Of course, there are factual disputes that make these cases
difficult to win. The existence of providing what amounts to the same
standard for defaming public figures (actual malice) as between
completely nonpublic figures is justified on the need for the candid
exchange of information.
B. Fact Versus Opinion
Unfortunately, the Restatement does little to clarify the
difference between fact and opinion. The reporters' notes state: "A
statement that implies a factual basis that is itself false may be may be
actionable if the false basis damages the employee's reputation.""
While it is impossible not to have cases on both sides of the fact and
opinion lines, it is also possible that the current standard does not
give adequate guidance on how to make the distinction.
Since employment law is relational, perhaps it should be
presumed that most statements about employees are going to be
factual in nature, or at least opinions based on facts. Thus, my
9.
10.

11.

See, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.02(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
Id. § 6.01 cmt. e.
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suggestions would be unless it clear that the employer predicated the
statement on a personal preference apart from facts, the statement
should generally be considered a statement of fact. This seems at the
heart of the subjective/objective distinction in many of the cases.
There are many cases where the line is difficult to draw, as in the
illustrative Second Circuit case Ross v. Davis.12 There, the singer
Diana Ross employed Gail Davis as a personal assistant for just over
eleven months in 1982. According to the record developed for trial,
Davis voluntarily resigned in late 1982, but there was no
determination in the record of why this occurred." On October 11,
1983, Ross then disseminated the following letter which Davis alleged
interfered with her employment prospects:
To whom it may concern:
The following [seven] people are no longer in my employment . .
[Gail Davis] ...

If I let an employee go, it's because either their

work or their personal habits are not acceptable to me. I do not
recommend these people. In fact, if you hear from these people,
and they use my name as a reference, I wish to be contacted." 4
Davis sued for libel alleging that the letter, read as a whole, falsely
asserted that Ross fired her and she was fired for unacceptable work
or personal habits. Davis claimed that Ross's letter was written with
actual malice, that is with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the statement, and sought $1 million in compensatory damages."
The District Court granted summary judgment for Ross because
the letter "expresses only Ross's personal dissatisfaction with [Davis],
rather than a general lack of capacity or unfitness."16 The Second
Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to trial, finding that the
trial court should not have granted summary judgment because
Ross's letter was susceptible to a defamatory meaning." Such cases
call out for a different way of drawing the line between fact and
18
opinion in employee defamation cases.

12. 754 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. at 81-82.
15. Id. at 82. She also sought $1 million in punitive damages.
16. Id. at 83.
17. Id. at 84-86.
18. 29 U.S.C. §157 (2112).
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C. Effect on Unionized Workplaces
In today's workplace, the ubiquity of the internet provides ample
opportunity for employers and employees to make potentially
actionable statements. Most of these issues have been adjudicated in
the National Labor Relations Board. This is because section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act provides protection for concerted
activity among employees for statements that are critical of the
employer.
An employer might find this speech harmful to its business and
decide that she should sue the employee for libel or slander. The
Restatement does not address this scenario. The definition of labor
dispute in federal law is very broad. Labor dispute, as defined by the
Supreme Court, applies to more than just strikes and picketing.
In general, there is little attention to the unionized sector in the
Restatement. This is understandable as reflecting the share of the
economy that unions represent (6.7 percent in 2015)," but the
obstacles facing unionized workers are even greater. Imagine that a
unionized worker loses his job because the number of absences
exceeds the number allowed under the contract. When a new
employer calls to ask for a reference, the employer says that his
attendance had always been poor." If reference to the contract is
necessary to determine the tort, the tort claim against the employer
for defamation may also be preempted.20
This chapter of the Restatement would have been helped by a
section discussing the claims of employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements. As is true often in the silo approach to
teaching labor law and employment law, there is not always sufficient
attention to the interaction between federal statutory law and state
common law regimes.
D. "The Forgotten Role of Consent"
Since it relies heavily on the Restatement of Torts in these
chapters, the REL runs the risk of compounding certain questioned
choices made by the Restatement of Torts. In his article, The Forgotten
Role of Consent in Defamation and Employment Reference Cases,
Alex Long discusses the influential role that section 583 of the
19. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, News Release, Union Members 2015
(Jan. 28, 2016), <https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2-01282016.pdf>.
20. See IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 862 (1987).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts has played in the development of the
defense of consent in defamation cases.2 1 In short, the defense of
consent by defendants is used more successfully in the employment
defamation cases than in other intentional tort cases because of the
Restatement.
As Professor Long argues, waiver - affected by the power
differentials that I have discussed herein - has taken hold in the
Restatement of Torts and "fundamentally misstated the law in a
manner that has negative consequences for employees who have been
the victim of defamatory references." 22 Long points to comment "d"
of section 583 of the Restatement of Torts, which states that an
absolute privilege of consent applies when a plaintiff "agrees to
submit his conduct to investigation knowing that its results will be
published," provided that investigators conduct a "fair and honest"
investigation and publish their "honest findings."" Long then
discusses the infirm doctrinal footings of this doctrine and how they
became entrenched in the Restatement of Torts.24
Of course, anytime an employee provides the name of a former
employer as a reference, he or she runs the risk of being be subject to
a defense of having consented to the defamatory statements by the
former employer. True, there is still a requirement that the
statements be "fair and honest" to assert the defense of consent, but
the absolute nature of the defense all but negates the otherwise
qualified privilege that is supposed to apply in defamation cases
involving employees. The REL compounds this error by neglecting to
specifically address the issue of consent or waiver in employment.
E. When the Employer is the Plaintiff
Because the scope of Chapter 6 deals explicitly with claims by the
employee against the employer, some interesting trends were not
addressed. One is the growing trend of strategic lawsuits against
public participation (SLAPP) and the rise of anti-SLAPP statutes and
litigation.2 5 Here is where the determination that the matter involves a
21. Long, supra note 8.
22. Id. at 719.
23. Id. at 759.
24. Id. at 753-71.
25. On Anti-SLAPP statutes, see Andrew Roth, Upping the Ante: Rethinking Anti-SLAPP
Laws in the Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, David C. Thornton, Evaluating AntiSLAPP Protection in the FederalArena: An Incomplete Paradigmof Conflict, 27 GEO. MASON
U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 119 (2016).
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labor dispute can be important. By limiting discussion to the use of
litigation by employees, however, this exercise of employer power in
response to employee and former employee speech goes
unaddressed. This will mean that the courts will lack guidance on how
these claims should be evaluated.
Similarly, there have been many questions about what happens
when an employee is the one badmouthing the employer, particularly
on social media. An employer may feel its their brand is tarnished by
the former employee's actions and wish to bring a lawsuit against the
employee. If the activities are found to be derived from a "labor
dispute," then the higher standard of actual malice would apply.
Under this standard, the employer must show that the employee
made statements with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
statement.26
III. THE WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE TORT (SECTIONs 6.03 & 6.04)

Sections 6.03 and 6.04 deal with the wrongful interference tort.
The placement of this discussion in Chapter 6, rather than in the
chapter concerning wrongful termination (Chapter 4) is confusing. As
with the defamation tort, there is a question about how often this
occurs. Either way, it usually comes up after a termination.
A. The Tort of Wrongful Interference: The Sleeper Claim?
Employees can bring the tort of wrongful interference when they
believe an employer has interfered with their employment by
intentionally causing another employer 1) to fire the employee or 2)
not to hire the employee. 27 Although the reporters' notes make clear
that damaging statements are not the only potential way to be liable
for these torts, these are the most likely to lead to assertion of the
wrongful interference tort. Professor Long has argued that these
claims are often overlooked by plaintiffs in favor of defamation cases,
which as discussed above are difficult to win.28 Indeed, as comment
"e" suggests, the employee's claim can be based on statements that
26. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
27. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). As comment a to section
6.03 describes, the tort is in some jurisdictions includes "intentional interference with the
performance of a contract" and sometimes includes "intentional interference with prospective
business relationship or advantage."

28. Alex B. Long, Tortious Interference with Business Relations: The "Other White Meat"
of Employment Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 863 (2000).
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are technically true and yet published with no "legitimate business
justification for doing so." 29
REL section 6.04 assures that an employer cannot wrongfully
interfere with its own employment relationship. This kind of case is
generally brought against managers who are not proper parties to a
tort claim for wrongful termination because they are not an
employer." True, the manager's privilege blocks most of these claims.
Depending on the state, however, the privilege can be lost through
showing that the manager used improper means and improper ends.
As with the defamation cases, various obstacles exist to successfully
bringing these cases for most workers. There is, however, the
possibility of a large jury verdict in cases of highly compensated
employees.32
This is just another way of making sure that the dominant rule of
employment at will is preserved. Once again, there is no dispute that
only the state of Montana has modified the employment-at-will rule,
but the focus of this section is really on those high-level employees
like executives that might have a claim for wrongful interference.
Again, many of these claims may be subsumed in whatever breach of
contract claims there are, but the REL leaves none of that to chance.
B. The At-Will Backdrop
Like many of the torts in the Restatement, the effectiveness of
this tort must be judged against the backdrop of employment at will.
Scholars have discussed the tort of wrongful interference and how it
works (or not) in an environment of employment at will.33 Once
again, the role that power plays in the workplace cannot be
adequately taken into account by the Restatement. But there are other
roads that could be taken that might serve to address power
differentials and extant doctrinal obstacles.

29. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 6.03 cmt. "e".
30. See id. § 6.04 reporters' notes.
31. Id. § 6.04 cmt. c, reporters' notes.
32. Mark N. Mallery, Legal Issues Arising in Connection with Workplace Investigations,
Paper for ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law 2nd Annual CLE Conference (Sept.
2008), <https://www.americanbar.org/content/damlabaladministrative/laborlaw/meetings/2008
/ac2008/042.authcheckdam.pdf>.
33. Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference
with Business Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 491 (2001); Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions,
11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2007).
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IV. OTHER ROADS NOT TAKEN

As with the rest of the Restatement of Employment Law, there
are procedural issues that might have been addressed but were not.
One of the anomalous procedural features is the separation in many
states between judges deciding whether there a statement of fact or
opinion on summary judgment and leaving to the jury whether the
statements, read as a whole, support a defamatory meaning. This
bifurcation can lead to many defamation claims being dismissed on
summary judgment because the court is making an evaluation of the
statement that might be better left to the jury.'
Another question involves why certain other torts aiming to
protect reputation were not discussed. One is the false light tort,
where the plaintiff must show: 1) the plaintiff is placed in false light
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; 2) the
defendant had knowledge or reckless disregard of the false light in
which plaintiff would be portrayed; and 3) the publication is
distributed to large numbers of people.35 Obviously, the elements
themselves present obstacles to many types of false light claims by
employees. Some cases, however, such as the Ross v. Davis case
mentioned above, might well meet the threshold. Further, in the
internet era, there are many instances where the dissemination might
be distributed to large numbers of persons much more easily.
Finally, the tort of public disclosure of private facts may provide
some relief. According to the Restatement of Torts, section 652D, the
tort is defined as follows:
"One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other in invasion of his privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that a) would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; and b) is not of a legitimate
concern to the public.""
While this is less likely to be asserted in the context of a negative
employment reference, it could apply in the context of negative
reputational information. Like the tort of false light, the need for a
wide dissemination of the embarrassing information also prevents
greater use by plaintiffs.
As shown above, the free flow of information is a primary

34.

This occurred in Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussed supra Part II).

35.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).

36. Id. § 652D. This tort is also referenced in the Restatement of Employment Law at
section 7.05.
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concern of the Restatement. The interests of employers are well
protected by the qualified privilege. The question is whether
recognizing the doctrine of compelled self-publication would also aid
the free flow of information. The answer is most certainly yes, and yet
the REL declines to do so.
Another vision of the torts of defamation and wrongful
interference would be a way to enhance employment prospects for
terminated employees. Defamation torts in the workplace function
differently than they do in other contexts. Without special attention
to the context of power relations in the workplace, the REL is not
appreciably different than the Restatement of Torts on defamation
and misrepresentation.
V. CONCLUSION

This article has aimed to discuss some of the issues that might
come up in the interpretation of the defamation and the wrongful
interference torts. While there are numerous ways in which the
Restatement might have summarized these torts differently, the
biggest questions are ones that the Restatement did not aim to answer.
First, how does employer power affect trends in employment law that
the Restatement aims to catalog? Second, what other trends and issues
that were not discussed in the final Restatement could serve to
rebalance existing power imbalances in the workplace? The answers
to those questions await further discussion by scholars and the courts.

